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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff, Iman Sharif, appeals from a jury verdict in 
favor of Defendants - several Northampton County Prison 
officers - on Sharif’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim.  
On appeal, Sharif argues that the District Court erred in 
admitting evidence of Sharif’s prior plea of nolo contendere 
and resulting conviction for assault in connection with the 
incident that is at the heart of his § 1983 claim.  He notes that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 prohibits the admission of his 
nolo plea.  He also urges that the Court abused its discretion 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 in admitting evidence of 
the conviction as relevant to his credibility.   
 
I. 
A. Factual Background 
 On March 11, 2009, Iman Sharif was an inmate at the 
Northampton County Prison.  He was housed in the 
Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) where Defendant-
Appellees Corrections Officers Nathan Picone (“C.O. 
Picone”), Thomas Pinto (“C.O. Pinto”), and Brian Potance 
(“C.O. Potance”) were all on duty.  While C.O. Picone was 
collecting dinner trays, he claims that Sharif “sucker 
punched” him.  (J.A. 369.)  In contrast, Sharif claims that 
C.O. Picone initiated the altercation by punching Sharif first.   
 C.O. Picone testified that once he was struck, he 
attempted to protect himself from additional punches and 
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kicks.  He further testified that C.O. Potance, who was 
assigned to help C.O. Picone retrieve dinner trays, entered 
Sharif’s cell and attempted to restrain Sharif.  At this point, 
C.O. Picone hit Sharif in the head with an open hand in an 
effort to “get him to the ground.”  (J.A. 371.)  Conversely, 
Sharif asserted that once C.O. Picone began to hit him, C.O. 
Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the 
attack by choking him.   
 
 Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and 
moved to a “suicide cell.”  (J.A. 446.)  According to 
Appellees, this was for his own safety; however, he continued 
to cause commotion so he was moved to a restraint chair.  
Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he 
was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, all 
of which was observed and permitted by Appellee-Defendant 
Lieutenant Joseph Kospiah (“Lt. Kospiah”).   
 
 Sharif was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) (2012) as a result of the 
altercation with C.O. Picone, C.O. Potance and C.O. Pinto.  
Sharif entered a plea of nolo contendere and was convicted 
under the statute as charged.
1
  Sharif’s excessive force claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on this incident.   
B. Procedural History 
                                              
1
 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) reads, “(a) Offense defined. 
– A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . (3) 
attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to any of the officers, agents, employees, or other 
persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of 
duty.”  Subsection (c) includes corrections officers. 
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 Sharif brought this § 1983 action alleging that C.O. 
Picone, C.O. Potance and C.O. Pinto are liable for attacking 
him in his cell in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to 
be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  Further, he 
contends that Lt. Kospiah is liable for allowing the physical 
abuse to proceed while Sharif was restrained.  Sharif sought 
relief of “nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages” for 
Appellees’ actions against him.  (J.A. 20.)  
 
 Pre-trial, Sharif filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410.  The 
Court noted that Sharif planned to take the stand and deny 
any wrongdoing in connection with the altercation.  The 
Court stated that if that were to happen, then evidence of his 
plea “may end up being relevant” and would thus be 
admitted.  (J.A. 123-24.)  During a hearing on the motion, the 
Court accepted Appellees’ counsel’s argument that “it would 
be inconsistent to allow [Sharif] to have taken the position in 
a prior court proceeding that he wasn’t going to contest the 
charges.”  (J.A. 123.)  In other words, the plea would be 
admitted as inconsistent with his assertion at trial that he had 
done nothing wrong and, therefore, as relevant to the issue of 
his credibility.   
 
 Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, during cross-
examination of Sharif, Appellees’ counsel twice referred to 
Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere to suggest that the plea was 
inconsistent with his statement at trial that he had done 
nothing wrong.  We quote directly from the trial transcript:    
Q: You stand before this jury and you have 
testified that you did absolutely nothing wrong, 
correct? 
A: Yes, sir.   
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Q: The officers just came in and struck you for 
no reason? 
A: Yes, sir.   
Q: Yet, in another court at another time you had 
an opportunity to say the same thing, correct? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You were criminally charged with assaulting 
Officer Picone, correct?  
A: Yes, sir.   
Q: And you didn’t contest those charges?   
A: No, sir. 
Q: You pled no contest?   
A: Yes, sir.   
 
(J.A. 216-17.) 
 
Q: Sure. Now, I want to get back to the first 
incident. It’s your testimony as to the first part, 
the incident with Picone, that he came in, struck 
you, you had absolutely done nothing wrong, 
correct?  
A: Wrong morally, like I did, I tried to get 
under his skin, I did talk about him. 
Q: Right, but you did nothing physical? 
A: Exactly. 
Q: You did not strike him first? 
A: Exactly. 
Q: Okay. But, that’s what you were charged 
with, correct, striking him first, that’s what you 
were criminally charged with? 
A: That's what -- [Objection] 
… 
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Q: Sure. You were charged with striking Officer 
Picone, correct? 
A: I was charged with assaulting him, yes. 
Q: Assaulting him. Okay. But, your testimony 
here today is you did not assault him in any 
way, shape, or form? 
A: And that’s [Objection regarding the 
definition of assault under this statute, 
i.e.,assault of an employee of the state] 
… 
A: You asked me if I assaulted him? 
Q: Correct. 
A: The same thing that I said before, I did not 
hit Officer Picone.  
Q: But, you did not contest in the criminal case 
that you assaulted him, correct? 
 
(J.A. 241 - 44.) 
 
 In his closing, counsel again referenced Sharif’s nolo 
plea, stating: 
 
He says he didn’t do a darn thing that day…yet 
when he had an opportunity in another court 
proceeding to contest that he didn’t do what he 
was accused of doing, he didn't contest it…yet 
he comes in here in another court proceeding 
and takes a different position. That should speak 
volumes about his credibility.  
 
(J.A. at 577.)   
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 During trial, the District Court allowed Appellees to 
introduce evidence of Sharif’s five prior convictions, 
including the conviction for assault resulting from his nolo 
plea, pursuant to the Court’s denial of Sharif’s motion in 
limine in which Sharif urged that the minimal probative value 
of these convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial 
effect.  The other convictions were for simple assault and for 
false reporting to a police officer.  The convictions were all 
admitted for the purpose of assessing Sharif’s character for 
truthfulness.   
 
 The Court instructed the jury as to the purpose for 
which past convictions were admitted into evidence:  “You 
may wish to consider those convictions as you weigh his 
credibility as a witness.”  (J.A. 605.)  The Court explained 
that one of the convictions was the result of a nolo contendere 
plea which, according to the Court, could be used only to 
evaluate Sharif’s credibility.  (J.A. 605-06; 222-23 (“[T]hose 
incidents of prior convictions are admitted for the sole 
purpose for you[, the jury,] to use if you so desire to consider 
the credibility of the witness.”)).  The jury returned a verdict 
against Sharif, and this timely appeal followed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over 
Sharif’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
9 
 
 
 A district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is reviewed de novo.  United States v. Furst, 886 
F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989). The application of a particular 
rule by a district court is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
 
III. 
A.  Rule 410: Admissibility of the Nolo Contendere Plea 
 Sharif urges that the District Court erred in allowing 
evidence of his plea of nolo contendere to be admitted 
because Rule 410 bars such admission.  Rule 410 states, in 
relevant part, “[i]n a civil or criminal case, evidence of [a 
nolo contendere plea] is not admissible against the defendant 
who made the plea.”  Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(2); see also Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 11(f) (“The admissibility or inadmissibility of a 
plea . . . is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 410.”); Fed. 
R. Evid. 803(22) (plea of nolo contendere excluded from 
exceptions to hearsay rule).  This prohibition is based on the 
fact that “a nolo plea is not a factual admission that the 
pleader committed a crime.  Rather, it is a statement of 
unwillingness to contest the government’s charges and an 
acceptance of the punishment that would be meted out to a 
guilty person.”  Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 
1999); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8 
(1970) (“Throughout its history…the plea of nolo contendere 
has been viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a 
consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he 
were guilty and a prayer for leniency.”).  An important policy 
consideration animating Rule 410 is that it encourages 
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compromise in criminal cases, which, in turn, lessens the 
burden on courts, defendants and prosecutors, producing a 
more efficient criminal justice system.  See Olsen, at 60 (“A 
second reason behind Rule 410’s exclusion of nolo pleas is a 
desire to encourage compromise resolution of criminal 
cases.”); see also 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 675 (2013) 
(“A plea of nolo contendere is used by the accused in criminal 
cases to save face and avoid exacting an admission that could 
be used as an admission in other potential litigation, to avoid 
trial with its attendant expense and adverse publicity in the 
event of a conviction.”).  Thus, the use of a nolo plea as 
tantamount to an admission of guilt would defeat one of its 
primary purposes.   
 
Despite Rule 410’s apparent clear command, there is 
caselaw supporting the admission of a defendant’s nolo plea 
in certain circumstances.
 2
  In Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 
138 (6th Cir. 1988), two African-American men were 
threatened and harassed by a mob of several hundred white 
high school students in a McDonald’s parking lot.  Id. at 139.  
As they attempted to flee the parking lot, they were arrested 
for disorderly conduct and reckless driving.  Id. at 140.  After 
pleading no contest to these charges, the defendants sued the 
arresting police officers for false arrest and wrongful 
imprisonment.  Id.  The police officers asserted a qualified 
immunity defense.  To determine whether they were entitled 
to this defense, the court examined whether the officers had 
violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established rights.  Id. at 141.  
                                              
2
 We note that, at oral argument, Appellees urged the 
applicability of caselaw allowing the admission of such a 
plea, but they failed to even mention Rule 410, or the relevant 
caselaw, in their brief.   
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The court found that the plaintiffs were “estopped” from 
arguing that their rights had been violated because, by 
pleading nolo contendere, they had “in effect, admitted facts 
in open court evidencing [their] guilt.”  Id. at 141-42.   
 
The Walker court went beyond the issue of collateral 
estoppel when it stated that its decision was not barred by 
Rule 410:   
 
Rule 410 was intended to protect a criminal 
defendant’s use of the nolo contendere plea to 
defend himself from future civil liability.  We 
decline to interpret the rule so as to allow the 
former defendants to use the plea offensively, in 
order to obtain damages, after having admitted 
facts which would indicate no civil liability on 
the part of the arresting police. 
 
 Id. at 143. 
 
This language has been cited by district courts within our 
Circuit, as well as by the Tenth Circuit, for the proposition 
that nolo contendere pleas are not always precluded by Rule 
410, particularly when a pleader attempts to bring a § 1983 
claim against officials for false arrest, false imprisonment or 
malicious prosecution.
3
  See Rose v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire 
                                              
3
 The underlying principle is that courts will not allow 
someone who has consented to be convicted, and therefore 
punished, pursuant to a nolo plea to claim that he was 
wrongfully arrested, wrongfully imprisoned or prosecuted 
maliciously, because the conviction that results from a nolo 
plea validates the government action.  
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Co., 219 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the 
nolo contendere plea was “not being admitted ‘against the 
defendant’” in the civil action); 4 Douglas v. Public Safety 
Comm’n, 1:01cv00419, 2002 WL 31050863, at  *8 (D. Del. 
Sept. 13, 2002) (finding Walker to be “instructive and 
persuasive”); Domitrovich v. Monaca, 2:08cv1094, 2010 WL 
3489137, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2010) (relying on Walker to 
hold that prior nolo plea barred claims for malicious 
prosecution and false arrest).  
 We view Walker as imprecise, and in any event, 
distinguishable.  First, Walker’s reference to a defendant 
“having admitted facts” through a nolo plea, 854 F.2d at 143, 
misconstrues the nature of the plea.  Indeed, we held in 
United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004), 
that a nolo plea is not an admission.  See also United States v. 
Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (“While a nolo 
plea is indisputably tantamount to a conviction, it is not 
                                              
4
 In Rose the court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be 
admitted in the narrow circumstance where a plaintiff was 
fired under the company’s no tolerance drug policy based on 
the plaintiff’s plea of nolo contendere to a drug possession 
charge.  Rose, 219 F.3d at 1219.  The plaintiff asserted 
wrongful discharge and argued that his plea of nolo 
contendere was inadmissible under Rule 410.  Id.  The court 
ultimately held that Rule 410 could not be construed “to 
affirmatively prevent an employer from presenting the very 
evidence used as a basis for its termination decision.”  Id. at 
1220.  Even though the court in Rose allowed the nolo plea to 
be admitted, it nonetheless noted that, “although a plea of 
nolo contendere has the same legal effect as a guilty plea, it is 
not a factual admission to the underlying crime.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
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necessarily tantamount to an admission of factual guilt.”).  
Second, the logic of Walker seems to flow from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 
(1994), where the Court held that when a § 1983 claim 
amounts to a collateral attack on a criminal conviction, the 
conviction or sentence must be reversed, or invalidated by 
other means, before a court can entertain the claim.
5
  
Similarly, the collateral attack in Walker would not be 
permitted, presumably, as a matter of fairness, outweighing 
the dictates of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  But we need 
not decide whether Rule 410 stands as a bar to the admission 
of a nolo plea when a defendant levels a collateral attack on 
his prior conviction.   
 We need not decide that question because even 
Appellees concede that Sharif’s claim of excessive force does 
not amount to a collateral attack on his aggravated assault 
conviction.  They further concede that he did not admit any 
“facts which would indicate no civil liability on the part of” 
the corrections officers.  Walker, 854 F.2d at 143.  Indeed, we 
held in Nelson v. Jashurek, that Heck does not bar an 
excessive force claim because the claim can stand without 
                                              
5
 District courts in our Circuit have relied upon Heck and 
Walker in tandem for the proposition that nolo contendere 
pleas, and the resulting convictions, bar pleaders from 
bringing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in certain instances. See 
Domitrovich, 2010 WL 3489137, at *7-8 (Heck bars § 1983 
false arrest and malicious prosecution claims because they 
would necessarily implicate the convictions, but an excessive 
force claim is not barred) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Douglas, 2002 WL 31050863, at *8 (§ 1983 excessive force 
claim barred because Walker found to be “instructive and 
persuasive” and Heck controlling).   
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challenging any element of the conviction.  109 F.3d 142, 
145-46 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here undoubtedly could be 
substantial force which is objectively reasonable and 
substantial force which is excessive and unreasonable.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas v. Roach, 
165 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 
predicated on excessive force during his arrest is not barred 
by his nolo contendere plea to the offense for which he was 
arrested).  Regardless of whether he engaged in assaultive 
conduct, Sharif remains free to contend that the reaction of 
the corrections officers was such that it constituted excessive 
force in comparison to the threat he posed.  Thus, Walker is 
distinguishable from this case.   
 
 District courts within the Third Circuit that have 
chosen to consider or admit past nolo pleas, have done so 
largely on the basis of collateral estoppel principles discussed 
in Heck.  As explained above, those principles are not 
applicable in this case, particularly given our holding in 
Nelson that Heck does not bar an excessive force claim 
because such a claim would not negate any element of the 
conviction.  Nelson, 109 F.3d at 145-46.  Given these 
considerations, we hold that Rule 410 barred the admission of 
Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere.    
 The admission of Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere was 
not harmless error.  See Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 
188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In reviewing evidentiary rulings, if 
we find nonconstitutional error in a civil suit, such error is 
harmless only ‘if it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the case.’”) (quoting Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
First and foremost, the District Court clearly ruled that the 
nolo plea should be admitted, and used by the jury, to assess 
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Sharif’s credibility because his trial statement was 
inconsistent with his previous nolo plea.  (J.A. 223, 606.)  But 
this is incorrect.  Indeed, a significant basis for prohibiting the 
evidence of the plea is the fear that it could be improperly 
viewed as an admission, and, unfortunately, that is how the 
District Court viewed it.  This was reversible error.   
 
 In Adedoyin, which was controlling authority at the 
time of the District Court decision, we unmistakably held 
that, with respect to a criminal charge, a nolo plea does not 
admit underlying facts or guilt.  369 F.3d at 344 (“[A] plea of 
nolo contendere is not an admission of guilt and thus the fact 
that a defendant made such a plea cannot be used to 
demonstrate that he was guilty of the crime in question.”); see 
also Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 566 (“While a nolo plea is 
indisputably tantamount to a conviction, it is not necessarily 
tantamount to an admission of factual guilt.”).  Consequently, 
Sharif’s claim that he did nothing wrong was not inconsistent 
with his previous plea of nolo contendere, and, thus, would 
not be relevant in assessing his character for truthfulness.   
 
 Moreover, insofar as it went to credibility, the 
Appellees’ line of questioning was very damaging.  Sharif 
was the only witness who testified on his behalf.  His 
credibility was of the utmost importance to his case.  By 
admitting his prior nolo plea, in violation of Rule 410, the 
District Court allowed Appellees to severely undermine 
Sharif’s credibility.  This damage was particularly acute given 
the method by which counsel strategically used the nolo plea 
to make Sharif appear untruthful as to the incident at issue.
6
  
                                              
6
 As quoted supra, Appellees’ counsel closed with the 
following statement: “[Y]et when he had an opportunity in 
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As Sharif points out, “[Appellees] argued that Mr. Sharif’s 
statements in this case should not be believed because they 
were contrary to his decision to plead nolo in his criminal 
case.”  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3.  For these reasons, we 
cannot say that the error did not affect the outcome of the 
case.   
 
 Finally, Appellees urge that it would be unfair to 
exclude Sharif’s nolo plea.  Appellees’ Br. at 20 (“To ignore 
his nolo contendere plea and attempt to keep from the jury 
that he, in a previous legal proceeding, and under oath, took a 
contrary position, would be inconsistent and dishonest on the 
part of the Plaintiff.”).  But this argument regarding 
inconsistency demonstrates how Appellees misconstrue the 
very meaning of a nolo plea and one of the purposes of 
excluding such pleas from evidence.  A nolo plea reflects a 
prosecutorial choice to permit a defendant to persist in not 
admitting the crime for the sake of obtaining the conviction.  
Thus, there is no inconsistency or “contrary position” at all.   
B. Rule 609: Admissibility of the Conviction 
 Sharif’s second argument on appeal is that the District 
Court erred in admitting his conviction for aggravated assault 
in connection with the altercation in prison, which he 
contends should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 609.  
As noted supra, we, along with other courts of appeals, have 
held that Rule 410 does not bar the admission of a conviction 
                                                                                                     
another court proceeding to contest that he didn't do what he 
was accused of doing, he didn't contest it . . . yet he comes in 
here in another court proceeding and takes a different 
position. That should speak volumes about his credibility.” 
(J.A. at 577.) 
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resulting from a nolo plea, but rather prohibits only the 
admission of the plea itself.  See Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 344-
45; Olsen, 189 F.3d at 58-62.   
 
 In Olsen, for example, the defendant was tried and 
convicted of first-degree murder.  After five years in prison 
his conviction was overturned and he was released pending a 
new trial.  Olsen, 189 F.3d at 55.  Rather than go through a 
new trial, Olsen pled nolo contendere to the charge of 
manslaughter.  Id.  He was sentenced to time already served 
and released.  Following his release, he brought a § 1983 
claim against the city and two police officers, seeking 
damages for his imprisonment.  Id.  On appeal, Olsen argued 
that Rule 410 barred admission of not only his nolo plea, but 
also of the resulting conviction and sentence.  The Olsen 
court held that Rule 410 clearly barred the admission of the 
plea itself, but declined to hold that the resulting conviction 
and sentence were barred under Rule 410.
7
  Id. at 62.    
 While the nolo plea is not a factual admission of guilt, 
and is to be excluded in light of the policy reasons we have 
discussed, the conviction resulting from the nolo plea is a 
legal finding of guilt, and there are no similar policy reasons 
that would support its exclusion.  See Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 
566 (“While a nolo plea is indisputably tantamount to a 
                                              
7
 To illustrate the policy behind Rule 410’s prohibition on 
admitting pleas of nolo contendere, the court in Olsen noted 
the distinction between nolo pleas and guilty pleas:  “[A] nolo 
plea is not a factual admission that the pleader committed a 
crime.”  189 F.3d at 59.  Conversely, a “guilty plea is an 
admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge.”  
Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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conviction, it is not necessarily tantamount to an admission of 
factual guilt.” (citing Adedoyin, 369 F.3d. at 344)).  Indeed, it 
is well-established that Rule 410 does not apply to the 
conviction itself, which is admissible subject to the 
limitations of the other Rules of Evidence.  See Brewer v. City 
of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 410 by 
its terms prohibits only evidence of pleas (including no 
contest pleas), insofar as pleas constitute statements or 
admissions.  Rule 609, by contrast, permits admission for 
impeachment purposes of evidence of convictions.”) 
(emphasis in original); United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 
136, 139 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]here is a distinct and 
meaningful difference between the evidentiary use of a plea 
to a criminal charge and a conviction of a criminal charge.”).   
 
 Rule 609 governs when prior convictions can be 
admitted to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness.  Rule 
609 reads in pertinent part: 
 
(a) In General. The following rules apply to 
attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness 
by evidence of a criminal conviction: (1) for a 
crime that . . . was punishable by death or by 
imprisonment for more than one year, the 
evidence: (A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 
403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in 
which the witness is not a defendant.   
 
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
Since Rule 609 is subject to Rule 403, courts must consider 
whether the probative value of a prior conviction is 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of admitting 
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the conviction.  See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
8
  In doing so, we have 
directed that four factors should be weighed against the 
potential for prejudice in admitting a conviction: (1) the 
nature of the conviction; (2) the time elapsed since the 
conviction; (3) the importance of the witness’s testimony to 
the case; and (4) the importance of credibility to the claim at 
hand.  United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 
758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 
 We review a district court’s application of a particular 
rule of evidence for abuse of discretion.  Balter, 91 F.3d at 
437.  In denying Sharif’s motion in limine and admitting his 
four assault convictions, including the 2009 conviction 
underlying his § 1983 claim that is the focus of his appeal, the 
District Court failed to conduct the required Rule 403 
analysis.  While that might normally prevent us from being 
able to review the Court’s exercise of discretion, here, we can 
easily conclude from our evaluation of the four Greenidge 
factors that the admission of the 2009 conviction was not a 
proper exercise of discretion.   
 
 Regarding the nature of the conviction, in pre-trial 
proceedings Sharif contended that, while his false reporting 
                                              
8
 Rule 403 states: “The court may exclude relevant evidence 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 
of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
403.   
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conviction
9
 was probative, the probative value of his other 
convictions – all for assault – was minimal.  See Mot. In 
Limine To Exclude Certain Irrelevant And/Or Prejudicial 
Evidence at 5.  At trial, without explanation or mention of 
Rules 609 or 403, the District Court permitted all four of his 
assault convictions to be introduced for impeachment 
purposes and gave a limiting instruction as to the jury’s 
consideration of them:   
 
You[, the jury,] have also heard that [Sharif] 
had been convicted of various crimes, and the 
only purpose for the admission of those crimes 
was as they affect his credibility.  You may 
wish to consider those convictions as you weigh 
his credibility as a witness.   
 
One of those convictions involved the assault 
and battery that was testified to at the beginning 
of this case.  That evidence may be considered 
by you in determining credibility.  If you think 
that it does that is your decision.   
 
(J.A. 605-06.)  
 
 On appeal, Sharif focuses specifically on the 
admission of his March 2009 assault conviction as error.  
Because the District Court allowed all three of his prior 
assault convictions to be admitted, we agree that the 
additional probative value of the March 2009 conviction 
regarding Sharif’s truthfulness was minimal, if not nil.  
                                              
9
 This specific conviction was under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
4914. 
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Moreover, often, crimes of violence are less probative of 
honesty than are crimes involving deceit or fraud.
10
  
 
 This does not mean that convictions for acts of 
violence should be excluded, but it does require a district 
court to be diligent in considering the nature of the conviction 
and its relationship to the issues at trial, and in explaining its 
reasons for admission under Rule 403.  This is particularly 
true in a case where the nature of the conviction is so closely 
related to the issue at trial.  Not only was the trial about 
violent conduct, Sharif’s 2009 aggravated assault conviction 
was for the very incident at the center of his civil claim.  It 
was not simply similar to the issue at hand, it was the issue at 
hand.  Thus, the first factor, “nature of the conviction,” 
weighs heavily in Sharif’s favor.  
 Examining the probative value under the remaining 
three prongs of the Greenidge test yields a balance in Sharif’s 
favor, and against the probative value of the 2009 assault 
conviction.  This conclusion is bolstered by the District 
Court’s decision to admit all three of Sharif’s other prior 
assault convictions, thereby further lowering the probative 
value of the conviction for aggravated assault at the center of 
this dispute.    
 
                                              
10
 As noted by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in Gordon v. United States, “[i]n common human 
experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for 
example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects 
adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity.  Acts of violence . 
. . generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and 
veracity.” 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).   
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 The second Greenidge factor, time elapsed between 
the conviction and the defendant’s testimony at trial, does not 
weigh in favor of either side.  When a prior conviction is not 
“remote in time” from the time of trial, it is more relevant to 
the case at hand than when it is an older conviction.  
Greenidge, 495 F.3d at 96; see also Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) 
(limit on using prior convictions that are more than 10 years 
old).  For example, compare United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 
1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1993) (conviction within the last six 
months was highly probative) with United States v. Paige, 
464 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (eight year old 
conviction was deemed to have diminished probative value).  
Mr. Sharif’s three year old 2009 conviction was not so far 
remote in time as to be irrelevant.   
 
 The final two Greenidge factors, the importance of the 
witness’s testimony and the importance of credibility to the 
claim at hand, overlap.  Sharif’s testimony was very 
important as he was his only witness, and for that very reason, 
his credibility was also crucial to his claim.  Sharif concedes 
that his credibility was “paramount to his case” as he was the 
only person to testify on his behalf about the events that led to 
this suit.  Appellant’s Br. at 24.  In assessing all of these 
factors we cannot help but conclude that the probative value 
of Sharif’s 2009 assault conviction was minimal.  Even 
though his credibility was the key factor in the case, this 
fourth assault conviction added little on top of the three the 
jury were already made aware of.   
 
 Balancing the limited probative value against the 
potential for prejudice, we conclude that the 2009 assault 
conviction should not have been admitted.  The primary 
concern regarding prejudice is that the jury may believe that 
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the defendant has a propensity towards acting in conformity 
with a prior bad act.  See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 
936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“[T]here is inevitable pressure on 
lay jurors to believe that if he did it before he probably did it 
this time.”).  Accordingly, we ask whether the admission of 
this conviction “ha[d] the potential to so prejudice the jury 
that its weighing of all the factual issues in the entire case 
may be impaired.”  Tabron v. Grace, 898 F. Supp. 293, 296 
(M.D. Pa. 1995).  The fact that the 2009 conviction stems 
from the same incident at issue here makes this type of 
prejudice a particular danger, and given its limited probative 
value, the balance clearly favors not admitting the conviction 
pursuant to Rule 403.     
 
 In some situations, a limiting instruction, such as that 
given by the District Court, can minimize the prejudice.  
Here, however, we cannot imagine the jury being able to 
compartmentalize the most recent assault conviction – already 
having evidence of the other three – as relevant only to 
Sharif’s character for truthfulness.  Such mental gymnastics 
may well be beyond the ability of the common man, and may 
be more confusing than helpful to the jury in light of the 
circumstances, as Sharif urges.  Appellant’s Br. at 25.  Jurors 
would be left wondering what the assault that relates to this § 
1983 action has to do with honesty.   
 Sharif’s credibility was sufficiently suspect given the 
falsification conviction, the three other assault convictions, 
and his status as a prisoner.  See Tabron, 898 F. Supp. at 296 
(“[T]he mere fact of incarceration in a state institution . . . is a 
significant tool for undermining the credibility of the 
witness.”).  Thus, the probative value of any conviction is 
diminished by virtue of the fact that the witness’s credibility 
is already tarnished.  The admission of the 2009 assault 
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conviction added nothing to the notion that Sharif’s 
credibility was suspect.  But it put the proverbial nail in the 
coffin as to the merits of his substantive claims in a way that 
we will not sanction.  Accordingly, we hold that in the new 
trial of Sharif’s case, the evidence of his 2009 assault 
conviction should not be permitted.   
 
 As with the admission of the nolo plea itself, the 
admission of the conviction was not harmless error.  As we 
said previously, Sharif’s testimony was critical to his claim.  
It was his account against the accounts of those accused of the 
wrongdoing.  The other convictions that were admitted, along 
with the fact that Sharif was incarcerated, already diminished 
his credibility.  Adding this additional conviction did not 
serve any purpose beyond making it nearly impossible for any 
juror to believe Sharif’s version of events.  Thus, we cannot 
say that the admission of this conviction did not affect the 
outcome of the trial.  
 
C. Punitive Damages Claim 
 Insofar as we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this case for a new trial, we find it 
unnecessary to reach Sharif’s argument that the District Court 
improperly granted judgment against Sharif on his punitive 
damages claim, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.  We expect that 
Sharif will again pursue punitive damages in his new trial and 
put forth evidence to support it.  The District Court will have 
the opportunity to assess the evidence presented at that trial; 
consequently, our ruling regarding what was presented at this 
trial, would be little more than an advisory opinion.    
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IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of Appellees is vacated and the case is 
remanded for a new trial.  
